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I apply survival analysis to model the factors that influence venture capital (VC) 
investment duration. Specifically, I fit a parametric survival model to plot the probability of 
venture capital exit over time. Given a small number of initial public offering (IPO) exits in the 
collected sample, the analysis focuses exclusively on exits through mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A). I fit a Cox proportional hazards model and a parametric model under the generalized 
Gamma distribution with financing, entrepreneurial firm, and VC firm characteristics. For the 
first time in the VC investment duration literature, I investigate the time to exit with data of 
Asian entrepreneurial firms and VC firms. The empirical analysis first draws comparisons 
between Asian, European, and North American venture capital, and then focuses the analysis to 
North America. I find that venture capital investments in North America are most likely to exit 
through M&A, followed by European VC investments and then by Asian VC investments. The 
region of the VC firm has no effect on the likelihood of an M&A exit.  
2 Introduction  
On December 5, 2018, the Financial Times reported that Softbank’s Vision Fund plans to 
open its first office in China next year, a move made with the intent to invest even more of its 
nearly $100 billion into Chinese tech-startups. In May of 2017 the Vision Fund became the 
largest corporate venture capital fund ever, raising money from investors worldwide, including 
Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund, Apple, Qualcomm, and Foxconn. Since inception, the 
Vision Fund has made a name for itself by writing large checks all over the world, investing in 
the likes of Bytedance, Uber, and Flipkart. As one of today’s most storied investors, the Vision 
Fund resembles the technology focused, global nature of the venture capital (VC) landscape. The 
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news comes in a year where the dollar volume of Chinese VC funding has outpaced that of the 
Silicon Valley for the first time. Figure 1 presents global split of VC deal and dollar volume in 
the second quarter of 2018 and Figure 4 plots VC by place of origin since 1992. 
Within the United States, venture capitalists continue to play a critical role, serving as an 
intermediary between innovative startups and the American tech-starts known as the Big Five. 
The top five American public companies in terms of market capitalization, Microsoft, Apple, 
Amazon, Google, and Facebook have sourced numerous important acquisitions from venture 
capital. Elemental Technologies, the video solution behind Amazon Prime Video and AWS, 
raised $45.7 million in funding before its sale to Amazon at $500 million. Intermediaries 
between the likes of Instagram and either M&A and IPO, venture capitalists make investment 
exit decisions that have consequences for investors and the structure of the nation’s most 
influential companies. With these observations in mind, the aim of this paper is to model the 
factors influencing the VC exit decision in an increasingly global, technology driven VC market.  
Studying the time and type dimensions of the VC exit decision offers insight as to how, 
when, and why entrepreneurial firms transition from the startup phase to the high growth phase. 
Previous analyses draw comparisons between the various forms exit, while this paper focuses 
solely on exit through acquisition. For the acquisitions made by the Big Five presented in Table 
1, I set out to model how the likelihood of M&A exit changes over time. I address the question: 
how do, if at all, financing characteristics, entrepreneurial firm characteristics, VC 
characteristics, and market conditions speed up or slow down the time to exit though acquisition. 
Plotted in Figure 5 is the Kaplan-Meier estimate for the cumulative hazard function of the Big 
Five acquisitions, which shows the cumulative probability that M&A exit has occurred over 
time. At this point, we only have a jagged understanding of when M&A exits are likely to occur 
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throughout a venture capital holding period. The task at hand is to estimate the hazard function, 
or risk of M&A exit function, for the likes of an Instagram changes with respect to time, 
financing characteristics, market conditions, startup region, VC region, and startup industry.  
The existing investment duration literature has already documented the factors 
influencing the VC exit decision in Europe and North America but has not done so in Asia. 
Additionally, in the European and North American contexts, studies of VC investment duration 
primarily use data observed prior to the turn of the 21st century. In an era where the number and 
dollar value of venture capital financings continue rise, it is imperative to update this dated 
research.1 Further, the literature does not investigate time to exit for the various stages of VC 
investments. Notably, there is no specification for Angel or Seed investors. While the literature 
develops other measures for investment stage, my analysis explicitly measures the time to M&A 
exit for Accelerator, Angel, Seed, and Series A, B, C or later investments. Through an 
implementation of survival analysis, I plot the instantaneous rate of M&A exit for a given VC 
investment with respect to time. 
The next section discusses the previous literature. Section IV discusses the data and 
determinants of venture capital investment duration. Section V presents the survival analysis 
techniques used. Section VI presents and discusses the results. The final section concludes. 
3 Literature Review 
The earliest papers in the venture capital (VC) exit literature draw upon theoretical 
frameworks to motivate empirical analyses. For example, Cumming and MacIntosh (2001) 
model the time to exit by comparing a VCs projected marginal value added (PMVA) to its 
projected marginal cost (PMC) of holding an investment. Under this model, exit occurs once the 
                                                 
1 Figure 2 includes CrunchBase’s projections for global venture deal volume. 
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PMVA is less than or equal to the PMC. In turn variation in investment duration is explained by 
shifts in the PMC and PMVA functions, which are determined by investor and investee 
characteristics and market conditions. 
Cumming and MacIntosh (2001) use this model to conclude that the time to exit is faster for 
earlier stage investments, a result they interpret as a consequence of VC funds sorting out 
winners from losers when future expectations are vague. In a follow up study, Cumming and 
MacIntosh (2003) document the influence of a country’s distinctive legal and institutional 
environment on VC behavior through a cross-country comparison of The United States and 
Canada. The paper demonstrates that IPOs and secondary sales are more likely to be affected as 
partial exits in Canada and not in the United States. Cumming and Johan (2010) also utilize the 
PMC-PMVA model to frame a comparison of investment duration in the U.S. and Canada. 
Canadian VCs are found to lag behind their U.S. counterparts on a number of levels. 
Specifically, the dominance of Labor-Sponsored Venture Capital Corporations inhibit Canadian 
VCs from achieving successful IPO exits, who seemingly rush their star firms to the public 
markets. 
 In addition to highlighting the restrictive nature of Canada’s VC landscape, Cumming 
and Johan (2010) confirm that expansion stage investments exit quicker than earlier-stage 
investments. Larger deals, non-IPO exits in times of stronger market conditions, and corporate 
VC investments also lead to shorter holding periods. 
Schwienbacher (2005) contrasts Europe with the U.S., reporting that European VCs have 
longer holding periods and less often use convertible securities, syndicate their deals, and replace 
former entrepreneurs. All of these differences are attributed to the fact that European venture 
capitalists face less liquid markets. When European VCs are examined in isolation, those 
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associated with financial institutions have quicker exits, a result that is most profound for trade 
sales (Felix, Pires, Gulamhussen 2008). Bertoni and Groh (2014) interestingly find that cross-
border VC investments benefit all participants in early-stage financing relationships, suggesting 
cross-border investments increase the efficiency of entrepreneurial finance. 
One more focus area is the distinction between corporate backed and independent venture 
capital funds. Guo, Lou, and Perez-Castrillo (2015) offer a mathematically rigorous theoretical 
model for the optimal exit strategy and investigate the likelihood of specific exits using hazard 
models. Compared to independent VCs, corporate VCs grant larger rounds of financing and, 
conflicting with Cumming and Johan (2010), take longer to exit an investment. Consistent with 
prior literature Guo, Lou, and Perez-Castrillo find that longer investment duration leads to a 
higher probability of exit via acquisition and larger investments are more likely to exit via IPO. 
 In conducting their statistical analysis, Cumming and Johan (2010) use hazard models to 
model the probability of a certain form of exit in a given year as a function of investor, investee, 
and transaction characteristics, as well as market conditions and country variables. While this 
econometric approach yields compelling results, it does not allow for a joint analysis of exit type 
and exit timing. It also fails to incorporate data of outstanding VC investments, which provide 
valuable insight regarding the factors that prevent exit. 
These are the shortcomings of OLS and logit regression that inspired Giot and 
Schwienbacher (2007) to employ survival analysis and competing risk models in their study of 
VC investment duration. Under this statistical approach they are able to report how the 
probability of a particular exit varies with time. For IPOs the hazard rate is found to be non-
monotonic. Initially the likelihood of an IPO is quite high and then drops sharply after 
experiencing a periodic plateau. The hazard rate for M&A exits is less time dependent. The 
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paper also finds that hotter IPO markets drastically increase the probability of IPO, large 
syndicate sizes accelerate all types of exits, Biotech firms have the fastest exits, and firms in the 
west and the northeast face easier M&A dynamics.2 
This paper follows the statistical methods applied in Giot and Schwienbacher (2007) in order 
to investigate the dynamic process of venture capital investment duration. IPO exits are 
incorporated but are not explicitly modeled due to a lack of available IPO data. I use survival 
analysis to plot the probability of M&A exit with respect to time, incorporating data from both 
exited and outstanding investments. Unlike the existing literature, I investigate VC investment 
duration in the context of Asian VCs and entrepreneurial firms, and Accelerator, Seed, and 
Angel investors. The paper tests previous results with updated data and draws new conclusions 
on differences in VC investment duration across location, investment stage, and industry. 
4 Data 
I use data from 39,594 venture capital financing rounds obtained from S&P Capital IQ. 
Financing dates range from January 1st, 2000 to October 29th, 2018. This data is ideal for my 
purposes because it updates previous analyses of VC investment duration, which rely primarily 
on data from the 1990s. S&P’s database includes VC investments in all regions of the world, 
allowing for comparisons across VC and target regions not documented in the existing literature. 
Specification for accelerator, angel, and seed investments are also included in the data, funding 
types which are also not studied in the VC investment duration literature. Lastly, the sampling 
period allows for an investigation of investment duration over the span of the Great Recession. 
The data are restricted to include financing rounds between $100 thousand and $250 million, as 
                                                 
2 One shortcoming of this work is that Giot and Schwienbacher do not include the confidence intervals for their 
estimates of the hazard function. 
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those observations are outliers outside the range of typical VC investments. To compute 
investment duration I match the data of financing rounds with a transaction screen from S&P 
Capital IQ consisting of M&A and IPO VC exits. The two datasets were combined by the name 
of the target firm, yielding 11,802 observations of unique financing rounds that result in exit 
through M&A or IPO. Since the data contains only 499 financing rounds that result in IPO exit, a 
competing risks analysis as done in Giot ans Schwienbacher (2007) is not feasible. Returns of the 
MSCI specific to the region of a given target region are computed using data from Thomson 
Eikon Reuters. For the M&A and IPO exits, I record the three-month return on the relevant 
MSCI at the date of exit. For Asian target firms, I use the AC Asia Pacific Index. The North 
America and Europe MSCI indexes are included for North American and European target firms, 
respectively. Target firms outside Asia, Europe, and North America receive the ACWI ex US 
MSCI index. This approach is consistent with the literature. 
4.1 Independent Variable and Predictor Variable Definitions 
The independent variable is investment duration, measured in days. To compute 
investment duration I subtract the closing date of the VC financing transaction from the closing 
date of the exit transaction. With the data at hand, I use 11,303 financing rounds resulting in 
M&A exit and 499 rounds resulting in IPO to model VC investment duration. For each 
observation I created a binary predictor set to one if the financing round exited in M&A and zero 
otherwise. Any observation which did not exit during the sample period has investment duration 
equal to the final date of observation, Oct 29th, 2018, minus the date of venture capital financing. 
Every observed financing round enters the empirical model, that process is detailed further in 
section five. The set of covariates analyzed include financing characteristics, the type of VC 
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investment, the industry of the target firm, the region of the target firm, the region of the VC 
firm, and market conditions, as is used in the existing literature. 
 The variables reflecting the financing characteristics are round size, syndicate size, and 
target age. Round size, measured in millions of US dollars, provides the amount of financing in a 
given round. Syndicate size measures the number of VC firms that participate in a particular 
financing round. Target age is the number of years since the founding of the target firm on the 
date of the financing transaction. 
 Funding type is a multilevel binary variable for the various types of VC funding, and is 
included as a proxy for both VC and target firm characteristics. Levels include Accelerator, 
Angel, Seed, Series A and B, and Series C and Later.  
Target industry is another multilevel binary variable with levels for firms in the 
Biotechnology, Retail and Consumer, Healthcare, Media and Entertainment, Semiconductor, and 
Technology industries. Firms not in those specified industries are included in Other industries. 
Target Region is a binary variable with levels for entrepreneurial firms located Asia, Europe, 
North America, and elsewhere in the world. North America includes firms from the United 
States and Canada. VC Region is a binary predictor with levels for Asia, Europe, North America, 
and other regions.  
A binary variable is included for VC investments held during the Great Recession, 
defined as December of 2007 through June of 2009. Lastly, the three-month return on the region 






4.2 Summary Statistics 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for round size, syndicate size, and target age for each 
funding type. Table 3 presents summary statistics of investment duration categorized by type of 
exit and the binary predictor variables. 
For investments exiting in M&A, average investment duration is longest for Series A and 
B financings, and shortest for Accelerator financings. Series C and later rounds have investment 
duration of 1,826 days, below the 1,967 days observed for Series A and B rounds. Angel and 
Seed financings have shorter investment duration on average at 1,038 days and 1,445 days, 
respectively.  
Media & Entertainment firms exiting through M&A have the shortest investment 
duration amongst the various industries at 1,578 days, and Semiconductors have the longest 
investment duration of 2,203 days on average. Investment duration for technology firms exiting 
through M&A is 1,850 days on average. 
The distributions for investment duration across the region of the entrepreneurial firm and 
the VC are quite similar. Exits of both kinds for North American targets take on average 1,883 
days. For Asian and European targets exiting through M&A or IPO, investment duration is 1,796 
days and 1,992 days. These summary statistics suggest that investment duration does vary 
depending on the region of the target and VC firm. 
For venture capital investments held during the Great Recession, exit through M&A took 






5 Empirical Method 
5.1 Survival Analysis 
 Survival analysis is a branch of statistics used to describe and quantify time to event data. 
‘Failure’ denotes that event of interest has occurred and ‘survival’ denotes that the event of 
interest has yet to occur. In this paper, the event of interest is VC exit through M&A and time is 
measured in days. I apply survival analysis to model the number of days until a VC firm exits an 
investment. Within survival analysis there are three terms are used to describe the time to an 
event: failure density, survival, and hazard. Under the VC framework, failure density is defined 
as the proportion of VC investments that have exited at a particular point in time. Let 𝒕 denote 
time in number of days, then the cumulative exit distribution function is defined 𝑭(𝒕). Figure 6 
plots the cumulative exit distribution for the data at hand. 
Provided 𝑭(𝒕) in Figure 6, the Survival function, 𝑺(𝒕) is defined as the proportion of VC 
investments that have yet to exit at time 𝒕. Graphically 𝑺(𝒕) is the area under the cumulative exit 
distribution function to the right of time 𝒕 . In the data the survival function equals zero at 
approximately 7,000 days. The hazard, denoted 𝒉(𝒕) , is the instantaneous rate at which a 
randomly-selected VC investment still outstanding at time 𝒕 − 𝟏 will exit at time 𝒕. Since we are 
concerned with quantifying the likelihood of a VC exit, hazard rates are of particular interest in 
this application of survival analysis. The cumulative hazard, 𝑯(𝒕), equals the area under the hazard 
curve up until time 𝒕. Central to purpose of this paper is plotting 𝒉(𝒕), because its shape indicates 
how VCs reach the exit decision throughout a holding period. 
The final component essential to the application of survival analysis herein is censoring. 
Survival analysis differentiates itself from OLS and logit regression as it incorporates information 
of VC investments that do not exit through a specific type of exit. IPO exits and non-exits in the 
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sample are censored observations. These investments contribute to the total time at risk for M&A 
exit for the number of days that they did not exit through M&A. Thus, IPO exits in the sample 
affect the hazard and survival functions for the duration of their holding periods, and non-exited 
investments contribute to the time at risk until the final sampling date. 
Non-parametric, semi-parametric, and parametric models are the three available methods 
for studying survival data. Nonparametric models make no assumption about the baseline hazard 
and survival functions. These models do not quantify the role a set of covariates play in slowing 
down or speeding up failure time. Semi-parametric models also make no assumption about the 
distribution of time to failure, but assume a functional relationship between the hazard function 
and a set of predictors. In parametric modeling, the shape of the hazard function and role of the 
covariates follow a particular theoretical distribution. Semi-parametric models are best for 
assessing the influence of predictor variables because the estimated baseline hazard function is 
closest to the baseline hazard present amongst the data. If predicting survival time is most 
important, parametric modelling is optimal as predictions outside the observation period are more 
accurate. 
When the data are consistent with a theoretical distribution, parametric modeling 
accurately describes the survival process. If the data does not fit a theoretical distribution, non-
parametric methods are used. Standard practice is to plot the survival data and look for consistency 
with a theoretical distribution. Figures 7 and 8 plot the cumulative hazard and survival functions 
as estimated by via Kaplan-Meier method.3 The hazard rate for venture capital exit data clearly 
varies over time, an observation consistent with that of Giot and Schwienbacher (2007). The 
implication of this observation is that any application of survival analysis must allow the hazard 
                                                 
3 The Kaplan-Meier method is a nonparametric method commonly applied in survival analysis and assumes that 
censoring is independent of survival time. 
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rate to move in any direction across time.4   To avoid the mistake of applying the incorrect 
theoretical distribution, I apply both semi-parametric and parametric models. 
5.2 Survival Models 
 As mentioned above, data from M&A exits, IPO exits, and non-exits are included in each 
survival model. Inclusion of IPO exits and non-exits are critical because under the VC framework 
investors are not restricted to one exit choice, nor are they required to exit an investment. Inclusion 
of these censored observations allow for better estimation of the survival function and a better 
model of VC investment duration. 
5.2.1 Semi-Parametric Modeling with the Cox Proportional Hazards Model 
 The first survival model applied to the data is the Cox proportional hazards model, a 
semiparametric model which allows the baseline hazard to vary time. The model makes three 
assumptions. One, the ratio of the hazard function for two individuals with different sets of 
covariates does not depend on time. Two, time is measured on a continuous scale. Three, censoring 
occurs randomly. The Cox proportional hazards regression is expressed as follows: 
𝒉(𝒕) = 𝒉𝟎(𝒕)𝒆
𝜷𝑿, 
where ℎ(𝑡) is the expected hazard rate for a specified time and ℎ0(𝑡) is the baseline hazard. Here 
a linear combination of predictors has a multiplicative effect on the hazard rate through the 
exponential function. To estimate the baseline hazard and conduct the analysis, the counting 
process formulation of the Andersen-Gill model is applied to the data through R’s survival 
package. 
                                                 
4 Two commonly used parametric distributions are the exponential distribution and Weibull distribution. The 
exponential distribution assumes the hazard to be constant over time, and the Weibull distribution assumes the 
hazard to be monotonically decreasing over time. The nature of VC exit processes require flexibility in the 
instantaneous hazard, and hence the assumptions of the exponential and Weibull distribution do not apply.  
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 Interpretation of Cox regression coefficients for various levels of the explanatory 
variables occur through the hazard ratio. Written as  
ℎ(𝑡)
ℎ0(𝑡)
= 𝑒𝛽𝑋, we can report differences in 
hazard rates for varying levels of the predictors as done with odds ratios in logistic regression. 
When Cox regression coefficients correspond to dummy variables for VC location, we can 
contrast investment duration for VCs in North America and Asia. In summary, Positive 
regression coefficients imply shorter investment duration and negative coefficients imply longer 
investment duration. 
5.2.2 Parametric Modeling with the Generalized Gamma Distribution 
I follow the approach of Giot and Schwienbacher (2007) and use the generalized Gamma 
distribution to estimate the hazard function for M&A exits. The generalized Gamma distribution 
allows for non-monotonously increasing or decreasing hazards, an appropriate choice given the 
shape of the hazard and survival curves estimated with the Kaplan-Meier method. This choice is 
also consistent with the intuition that the probability of VC exit rapidly increases early in the 
holding period before reaching a peak and declining constantly. The generalized Gamma 
distribution is a shaped by three parameters 𝜅, 𝜎, and 𝜇 as follows: 
𝑓(𝑡, 𝑧, 𝜎) =   
𝛾𝛾
𝜎𝑡√𝛾Γ(𝛾)
𝑒𝑧√𝑦− 𝑢  
when 𝜅 ≠ 0, and 





if 𝜅 = 0, where 𝛾 = |𝜅|−2, 𝑧 = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝜅)(ln(𝑡) − 𝜇)/ 𝜎 , 𝑢 = 𝛾𝑒|𝜅|𝑧. The predictor variables 
influence the time to exit through 𝜇’s inclusion in the equation for 𝑧 . For an M&A exit indexed 
by 𝑗, the specification for 𝜇 is:   
𝜇𝑗,𝑀&𝐴 =  𝑋𝑗𝛽𝑗 . 
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 The 𝜅 and 𝜎 parameters determine the general shape of the hazard function while the 𝛽 
coefficients determine the time acceleration. The functional form of the generalized Gamma 
distribution requires a different interpretation of the  𝛽 coefficients than for the Cox proportional 
hazards model. Here a negative 𝛽 coefficient implies that an increase in the corresponding 
predictor leads to a faster exit and positive 𝛽 coefficients imply a slower exit at higher levels of a 
given predictor. For example, a negative coefficient on a binary variable for technology firms 
suggests the time to exit for technology firms is shorter. Binary variable coefficients can be 
interpreted through relative hazard ratios as for Cox regression coefficients. 
 Estimates for the unknown parameters 𝜅 and 𝜎 are determined by maximizing the joint 
likelihood for the all 𝑁 investments in the sample, 







where 𝜹𝒊 = 𝟏 denotes M&A exits 𝜹𝒊 = 𝟎 denotes investments which have not exited through 
M&A. Thus, 𝒇𝒊  is the density function for M&A exits, and 𝑺𝒊 is the survival function for all other 
investments. Application of this parametric model is done through R’s flexsurv package. Variables 
for market conditions are not included in the parametric model specifications because when 
included, the Hessian matrix was not positive definite, and the maximum likelihood estimator 
could not converge. 
6 Results 
I first discuss the conclusions from the survival models containing all of the predictors.5 
Using the full model as a guide, I estimate the hazard functions for the various target regions, VC 
                                                 
5 For the model containing all of the predictors, the reference levels for round type, target region, VC region, and 
industry are Series A and B, North America, North America, and Other industries. 
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firm regions, round types, and industries. Regression coefficients and their significance are 
included in Tables 4 through 9. Figures 9 through 16 plot the Hazard functions estimated by the 
parametric model. 
6.1 Venture Capital Investment Duration in a Global Context 
Using the regression outputs from Table 4, the following can be answered: how does, if 
at all, the likelihood of M&A exit change when a North American VC invests in a foreign startup 
firm? According to the Cox proportional hazards model, when North American VCs invest in 
European startups, the hazard rate of M&A exit falls by 15.3 percent.  
Both the Cox proportional hazards and parametric models confirm that syndicate size and 
target firm age influence the time to exit through M&A. As documented in the previous 
literature, larger syndicates and older firms lead to shorter VC investment duration. Round size 
does not have a statistically significant influence on the time to exit through M&A. The 
coefficient for VC investments held during the Great Recession is large and statistically 
significant. At 0.25, the hazard ratio for the Great Recession indicator variable implies a 75 
percent reduction in the expected hazard relative to investments not held during Great Recession. 
As expected, Positive stock market returns reduce the time to exit. 
Series C and later rounds are associated with shorter investment duration than Series A 
and B rounds. Angel, Seed, and Accelerator financings are slower to market than Series A and B 
financings. These results appear inconsistent with summary statistics but are consistent with the 
application of survival analysis. Known for packaging startups for larger venture rounds as 
quickly as possible, Accelerators traditionally hold their equity positions for less than four 
months. On average, Accelerators in the data take 897 days to exit through M&A shorter than the 
average investment duration for Series A and B exits. Regardless of these sample averages, the 
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hazard ratio for accelerator exits is 44 percent lower than that of Series A or B financings. This 
result is attributable to the fact that only 7.3 percent of the observed Accelerator investments exit 
through M&A. In turn, the majority of accelerator observations are censored in the analysis, 
greatly increasing the total time at risk. Only 42 percent of the Series A and B rounds result in 
M&A exit, so the total time at risk per observation is much lower than that for the accelerator 
investments. As such, the area underneath the cumulative M&A exit density function for 
Accelerators increases ever so slightly for a one-unit increase in time, implying a very low 
hazard rate relative to that of Series A and B rounds. The story for Angel and Seed investments 
is similar, as only 15.2 percent of the Angel investments and 17.9 percent of the Seed 
investments exit through M&A in sample. Thus, at any instant in time, a randomly selected 
Series A or B round is more likely to exit through M&A than a randomly selected Angel or Seed 
round. 
Estimation results from both models provide evidence that Media and Technology firms 
are quicker to exit than firms in other industries are. The Cox proportional hazard model finds 
that Biotechnology firms exit through M&A at a slower rate than other industries, but the 
parametric model does not. 
Both the Cox proportional hazards and the parametric models estimate positive 
coefficients for Asian targets, an inconsistent result. Despite this shortcoming, the coefficients 
for startup firms in Europe and regions outside Asia, Europe, and North America are consistent. 
At any point in time, a European startup firm is less likely to exit through M&A than a North 
American startup. 
Estimation results provide evidence that Asian VC firms slow down the M&A exit 
process when investing in North American startups firms. The hazard ratio for Asian VCs is 11 
21 
 
percent lower than the hazard for North American VCs. There is only weak statistical evidence 
that European VCs prolong the period before an M&A exit. 
Hazard ratios offer valuable insight, but are static interpretations of variability in exit 
timing across different levels of the predictors. By plotting the survival function and hazard rate 
of a particular investment over time, we can observe changes in exit preferences over time. As 
plotted in Figure 9, the hazard of VC exits increases sharply early in the holding period, peaks 
around 1,500 days, and then slightly decreases for the rest of time. A relatively constant hazard 
after the first 3,000 days suggests that the likelihood of M&A exit is not particularly sensitive to 
time when compared to the hazard for IPO exits. Giot and Schwienbacher (2007) plot the hazard 
for IPO exits, which experiences a much steeper decline over time. In summary, the window of 
opportunity for IPO closes much faster, whereas the window of opportunity for M&A is open for 
a longer period. 
Figure 10 plots the estimated hazard function specified for VCs in Asia, Europe, and 
North America. The confidence of the estimated interval for Asian VCs is wide. Given the 
inconsistent estimation of the regression coefficient for Asian VCs across the two models, there 
is no conclusion on the relative behavior of Asian VCs. The only takeaway from this estimation 
is that the shape of the M&A hazard function for Asian VCs is consistent with that of European 
and North American VCs. Confidence intervals for the European and North American hazards 
separate in the first 1,500 days before converging at roughly 3,500 days. Here we observe that 
North American VCs are more likely to exit through M&A the earlier in a holding period. 
 The hazard rate for later stage investments varies the most across time. In the first 1,000 
days after funding, Series C and later financing rounds are the most likely to exit through M&A. 
Between 1,000 and 3,000 days, the hazard for Series C and later rounds swing drastically. In 
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contrast, hazards for Seed and Series A and B rounds plateau at around 1,500 days. These 
findings reflect the nature of later stage venture capital financings. At Series C a startup’s value 
can be estimated with more certainty and hence the firms interested in acquiring the startup have 
fewer doubts over the potential to realize that value. A final observation is that the hazard 
functions for early stage financings and later stage financings do not converge until 4,000 days, 
suggesting that greater product maturity and additional funding significantly improve a firm’s 
M&A prospects. Given the variability in the hazard rates across each type of funding, the 
ensuing models are restricted to Series A and B financings only. 
6.2 Target Region and M&A Exit in the Global Context 
The estimated hazard functions for target firms in Asia, Europe, and North America 
differ across time but follow the same general shape. North American startups have the highest 
probability of M&A exit approximately 4,000 days, and Asian target firms have the lowest exit 
probability. The estimated hazard for Asian startup firms ascends gradually, and plateaus earlier 
than for other regions. North American entrepreneurial firms experience the most rapid ascent in 
exit probability and plateaus above all other regions. Confidence intervals for these hazard 
functions included in Figure 12 demonstrate that exit probability differs across target region 
during the earliest stages of the holding period. However once investment duration spans over 
5,000 days, the confidence intervals of each hazard converge to similar levels. It is important to 
note that there is only a statistical difference in the hazard functions between 1,000 and 3,000 
days. 
Table 5 reports regression coefficients for the Asian, North American, and models. Exit 
probability varies with financing characteristics, industry specification, and VC region. As 
before, larger syndicates and older firms lead to shorter investment duration. Media and 
23 
 
Technology firms have shorter investment duration, and Biotechnology firms are weakly 
associated with longer investment duration. The coefficient on Asian VCs is exit-protective, 
suggesting that Asian VCs who invest in North American firms slow down the exit process. 
North American startups who receive investment from an Asian VC experience a hazard 
reduction of 15.8 percent. 
 With only 471 observations, estimation results for Asian target firms are less reliable, but 
the models are still useful in creating a guide for future research. Later financing rounds 
experience faster exits, while Biotechnology and Consumer firms experience wait longer to exit 
through M&A. The coefficient for Asian technology firms is significant only in the Cox 
proportional hazards model, where it implies a 31 percent increase in the hazard relative to other 
industries. Here we detect evidence that Asian technology firms are associated to a faster M&A 
exit, but the evidence is not overwhelming. 
 Increases in round size, syndicate size, and firm age speed reduce investment duration for 
European firms. Media and Technology firms experience faster exits, while Biotechnology firms 
wait longer to exit through M&A. For North American firms the relative time ratio between 
Technology firms and all other firms computed from the parametric model is 0.69 times. For 
European firms that ratio is only 0.80 times.6 Lastly, investment duration is longer when Asian 
VCs invest in European target firms. The coefficient for Asian buyers in the European model 
implies a relative time ratio of 1.43 times, statistically similar to the relative time ratio of 1.26 
times observed in the North American model.7 These relative time ratios are computed using the 
parametric model results. Under the Cox proportional hazards model, the coefficient on Asian 
                                                 
6 The confidence intervals for the relative time ratio for North American technology firms and European technology 
firms are (0.64, 0.73) and (0.73, 0.87), respectively. Estimates obtained from the parametric survival model. 
7 The confidence interval for the relative time ratios for Asian VCs investing in North American and European target 
firms are (1.13, 1.41) and (1.07, 1.93), respectively. Estimates obtained from the parametric survival model. 
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VCs is only significant for North American target firms. For European target firms, the presence 
of an Asian VC does not affect investment duration in the Cox proportional hazards model. The 
takeaway from the European model is that Asian VCs may in fact influence investment duration 
in Europe, but more data and more confidence in the survival model are necessary to draw a 
definitive conclusion. 
6.3 North American Investment Duration and Foreign VCs 
 To measure the influence of VC region for North American startups, I restrict the data to 
Series A and B rounds and specify a model for each buyer region. The estimated parametric 
hazard functions for each region provide little evidence of a difference in VC investment 
duration for North American firms given the presence of a foreign VC firm. Figure 13 plots these 
estimates. Specifically, the hazard functions for North American and European VCs overlap, and 
the confidence interval for the presence of an Asian VC is particularly wide. The estimated 
survival curves from the Cox Model tell the same story. Significant overlap in the survival 
curves imply that foreign VCs do not influence the likelihood of an M&A exit.  
 Table 6 presents the regression coefficients for each model. A notable observation is that 
the estimated technology coefficients for each parametric model are approximately equal.8 It is 
reasonable to conclude that VC region does not play a significant role in venture capital 
investment duration for North American technology startups.  
Despite the conclusion that VC region does not account for a statistical difference in 
investment duration, regression results for each model suggest that cross-region syndicates may 
influence investment duration. In the models specified for North American VCs investing in 
                                                 
8 The confidence interval for Technology in the North American model is (-0.44, -0.30). For the Asian VC firm 
Technology’s confidence interval is (-0.66,-0.11). For the European parametric model, Technology’s confidence 
interval is (-0.52,-0.17). 
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North American startups, the coefficients on Asian VCs reduce the exit hazard rate. The 
interpretation of this result is that when Asian VCs invest alongside North American VCs, 
investment duration is longer. In the European VC model, the coefficient on North American 
VCs is negative and significant, implying that the addition of a North American buyers speed up 
the exit process when investing with European VCs. These results in mind, I fit a series of 
models designed to test the influence of cross-region syndicates on venture capital investment 
duration. 
Table 7 presents estimation results for syndicates consisting of North American VCs 
only, the combination of North American VCs and Asian VCs, and the combination of North 
American and European VCs.9 Plotting the parametric estimations of the hazard functions does 
not allow for the conclusion that cross-region syndicates influence investment duration. 
Confidence intervals for the estimated hazard function overlap for almost the entirety of the 
investment horizon. 
The empirical analysis within this section does not warrant the conclusion that VC region 
influences investment duration amongst North American startups. Ultimately, these results are a 
reflection that a VC firm’s location does not reflect the idiosyncrasies and preferences inherent to 
its investment strategy. I suggest further analysis of the connection between VC region and 
investment duration be carried out through case study rather than empirical analysis.  
6.4 Industry and Investment Duration in North America 
 Plotting the hazard functions by industry within the United States a number of interesting 
results. For one, the hazard for Biotechnology firms is well below that of all other industries for 
the first 2,000 days after an investment is made. Estimation of the Biotechnology hazard function 
                                                 
9 Interaction terms between each of these combinations were tested, but there was not enough data for accurate 
estimation of the survival models. 
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is unreliable after 3,000 days. For Media startups, the hazard rate rises above other industries and 
peaks at 1,000 days. After the 1,000-day mark, the hazard rate steeply declines to levels below 
that of technology firms and other industries. Throughout the analysis Media’s regression 
coefficient imply a faster to exit, but here we see that only holds true for the first 1,000 days after 
venture capital investment. Technology startups maintain the highest hazard rate for all levels of 
investment duration, implying that tech startups are the most likely to exit through M&A. Hazard 
functions for the Biotechnology, Consumer, and Healthcare industries have very large 
confidence intervals that diverge as investment duration increase, and hence were not included.  
 Table 8 reports the regression coefficients for technology investments in North America. 
Larger VC syndicates and older firms are associated with shorter investment duration as seen 
throughout the analysis. Accelerator investments in technology startups are least likely to exit 
through M&A than Series A or B financings, while Series C or later investments got to market in 
less time. The relative time ratio computed with parametric model coefficients between an 
Accelerator investment and a Series A or B financing is 1.66 times. Between Series C or later 
and Series A or B, the relative time ratio is 0.82 times. Lastly, when an Asian VC firm invests in 
a North American technology or media firm, investment duration is longer. 
6.5 Type of VC Funding and Investment Duration in North America 
 Lastly, the two models were fit for each funding type and restricted to North American 
target firms. Results from both the Cox proportional hazards model and parametric model are 
consistent and reported in Table 9. Round size is significant only for later series financings, and 
is associated with increased risk of M&A exit. This result does not hold for other investment 
stages, indicating that funding amounts may only coincide with a VC’s exit strategy once there is 
greater visibility into the future financial performance of the entrepreneurial firm. For Series A 
27 
 
and B financings older firms lead to slightly faster exits, additional evidence that the VC exit 
strategies are dependent on the information at hand. Media and technology firms are still 
associated with shorter holding periods. 
 Plots of the hazard functions for each investment stage are available in Figure 17, and 
reveal that the hazard function for Seed investments is relatively constant over time while the 
hazards for Angel and Series C or Later investments are more dynamic. The confidence interval 
for the hazard of angel financings is particularly wide due to a smaller number of observations, 
but is estimated with more precision as duration increases. With the data at hand, Angel 
financings experience the sharpest peak and drop in exit probability. The Angel hazard initially 
spikes above that of Seed financings before falling to the lowest levels of all other investment 
stages. Series C and Later have the highest hazard rate in the first two thousand days after 
investment, and then falls to the level of Series A and B financings. A plot of the hazard function 
for Accelerator investments was estimated separately and trained on all of the available data. The 
shape of the hazard for accelerators is similar, but more data is required to procure an accurate 
estimation.  
7 Conclusion 
In the outset, I noted the increasing relevance of venture capital in Asia as well as the 
intermediary role venture capitalists play between startups and the most important countries in 
the United States. Specifically, we plotted Kaplan-Meier estimates of the M&A exit hazard 
function for notable Big Five acquisitions. The intention of the empirical analysis was to build a 
survival model capable of explaining the path to exit for not only these pivotal deals, but for 
deals worldwide across all stages of venture finance. In a global VC landscape no longer 
dominated by the Silicon Valley, it is important to assess how venture capitalists stage their 
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investments both domestically and abroad. In my application of survival analysis, I conclude that 
the region of the VC firm has no influence on investment duration. Fitting a parametric survival 
model for entrepreneurial firms in Asia, Europe, and North America reveals that the hazard rate 
for M&A exit is highest for North American startups and lowest for Asian startups. 
Figure 17 plots the estimated hazard function for Instagram’s three rounds of venture 
capital financings. As concluded in the results section the hazard for Instagram’s earliest 
financing rounds is much lower than that of its later financing rounds. In the first 1,000 days 
Instragram experiences a pronounced increase in the likelihood of M&A exit. After peaking at 
around 1,200 days, the hazard decreases monotonically. Instagram received its first seed 
financing in October of 2010, followed by a Series A round from Benchmark of $7 million in 
2011, and then a Series B round of $50 million from Sequoia Capital in 2012. The hazard rate is 
highest for that of Sequoia’s financing round, attributable to the Instagram’s older age at Series 
B. This bite-sized application of survival analysis to Instagram demonstrates the approach 
applied herein and also the untapped value survival analysis has to offer.  
Researchers should work to acquire detailed data that extends beyond the basic predictor 
variables used in this paper. If there was easily accessible data on fund preferences, financial 
performance of startup firms, or any other metric capable of capturing the idiosyncrasies across 
VC firms and startup firms, more meaningful interpretations could be drawn from the application 
of survival analysis to venture capital data.  
Until such data becomes available Future studies of venture capital investment duration 
should be carried out through case studies of a handful of venture capital funds investing across 
different startups around the world. Evaluating VC investment duration on a case by case basis in 
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different regions will undoubtedly paint a clearer picture of how VC exit decisions can influence 
the future of entrepreneurial firms. 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics for Investment Duration 
34 
 















Table 6. Cox Proportional Hazards Model and Parametric Model Estimation Results for North American Startups:   








Table 7. Cox Proportional Hazards Model and Parametric Model Estimation Results for North American Startups:   
















Table 8. Cox Proportional Hazards Model and Parametric Model Estimation Results for North American Startups: 
Industry and Investment Duration 
 
 









Table 9. Cox Proportional Hazards Model and Parametric Model Estimation Results for North American Startups:   
















Figure 1. Proportional Split of Reported Global VC Deal & Dollar Volume in Q2 2018, 
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Figure 17. Instagram’s M&A Exit Hazard Functions 
 
The top line plots Sequoia Capital’s $50 million Series B round (2012), the middle line plots 
Benchmark’s $7 million Series A round (2011), and the bottom line plots Instagram’s seed round of $500 
thousand (2010). 
